Flaunt your flaws: Don’t communicate the Toyota Way

A while back, the Gemini Directorate tasked an internal team to develop suggestions and techniques for better communications and task management within Gemini.  We took our mission very seriously and researched what many successful and unsuccessful companies have done to address these issues themselves.  Sometimes we found support for our own biases and ways of doing things, while other times, we learned new ways that were an improvement on what we were doing and thinking ourselves.  A recurring theme of our report was the importance of developing more varied, and open communications.   As I discussed in my semi-review of The Five Dysfunctions of a Team , the basis of teamwork is trust.  I don’t think anyone will accuse me of going out on a limb when I say the basis of trust is good communication.  The key word here is good for  not just any communications will do the trick; there must be a history of full, honest, and open communications for trust to develop.  People often think they are communicating when they say anything, and  they are by one definition of the word, but they aren’t building trust and a sense of teamwork unless that communication is received and is both honest and open.

I was reminded of this report of ours after reading an editorial on the current Toyota recall disaster. Toyota’s response to the problem is fairly typical and only served to exacerbate its predicament and cost them a valuable loss of community trust.  Bad news?  First ignore it, maybe it will go away. Still there?  Downplay it; things aren’t nearly as bad as they seem.  Still not enough? Say you’re looking into things. You’ll take care of it.  What? The people demand more?  You have to act?  OK, admit to maybe you may have done something less than ideal and you regret it if something bad might have happened for something you might have done or not.  What?  They mean it? You really have to do something? Well, maybe now you will have to really take action, but if you waited until this point to act, chances are your problem is a lot bigger than it was in the beginning and chances are that you won’t get the credit for having done the right thing once you finally appear forced into doing so.  In this instance, one thing is clear: do not emulate the Toyota way!

The Toyota President: wondering why he didn't act sooner? Reuters

So here, I want to take some thoughts from our working group report, expand upon them a bit, and start off by wondering why people often do not communicate openly, why they often hide the whole truth and paint a friendlier, but inaccurate picture of the situation.  Why aren’t full open disclosures at all times the norm?

For one, people worry that someone will misinterpret something they say, causing great grief and frustration for all involved. Yes, this will happen, but the cause is often a lack of complete information. Complete information provides the context and the motivation behind an action or a situation.  The solution, then, is not to further hold back even more information, but rather to provide more information to remedy the confusion. Rumors, speculation, and misinterpretation all arise from incomplete communication. When people only get a small fragment of information through indirect means, they extrapolate and infer to fill in the gaps in their knowledge.  Once you start providing regular amounts of real information, people will understand the context and motivations better and will be less likely to get the wrong impression or jump to the wrong conclusion. Your audience will learn how to interpret your news. This broader understanding will end up returning to you in new ideas and solutions to problems from sources never tapped before.

Second, people worry what effect negative information will have on their reputations. Many organizations, however (I cited Redfin and the Sloan Digital Sky Survey through specific examples in the full report and would be happy to talk more about their efforts here, if there’s interest), proved that communicating your problems as well as your successes actually helps your reputation. No organization is problem-free and those that report to be so are undoubtedly viewed with suspicion and distrust When you hide information, you implicitly are stating that you are doing things others will not like. This is not the image you usually want to project.

Finally, some hoard information to seemingly protect their jobs. What these people do not realize is that everyone else is just as busy as they are and few of us have time to take over someone else’s job even if all the instructions on how to do so were readily available. In any growing, exploring, exciting organization (like Gemini), there are always important new projects people could be doing if only there were more time. If, by distributing your knowledge out to the community, you can offload some of your tasks, you can begin new tasks that would not get done otherwise. No one’s importance to a high-efficiency organization is determined solely by what information they know.

Furthermore, information hoarding causes severe inefficiency in information transfer. Someone needing information cannot simply go to a reference source to find it, but must first find out (usually after several failed attempts) who the information custodian is, then try to extract the information. Instead of a quick web search or visit to a document library, many people become involved in the information quest and when the single source is ultimately discovered his/her reputation is not enhanced by the unique knowledge, but lessened by it being so difficult to find.

So, returning to the issue of trust, I note an article from the July/August 2008 Harvard Business Review discussing the common traits of CEOs in a selection of companies that have transformed themselves into high efficiency organizations [the emphasis below is their’s]:

The CEOs we studied [created a link between the people who do the work and the performance they must deliver] by combining four strategies. First, they earned the trust of their organizations through their openness to the unvarnished truth. Second, they were deeply engaged with their people, and their exchanges were direct and personal; employees in the companies we studied had a particularly close connection with the CEO and were seldom surprised to meet him or her. Third, having earned legitimacy and trust, these CEOs were able to mobilize their people around a focused agenda. Finally, while they were all strong individuals, these senior leaders realized that they could succeed only as part of a committed leadership team, and they devoted considerable efforts to building their firm’s collective leadership capabilities.

The emphasis in this excerpt is about building trust within an organization, but the concepts apply equally well to building trust outside an organization as well.  By communicating openly with your public early, you provide transparency and engender trust.  You forestall the temptation to jump to conclusions and to assume the worst.  Your form a sense of team and you  implicitly bring in your community in helping to solve the problem, rather than leaving them to wonder why you aren’t doing enough already.  You turn your customer base into a community, wanting you, often working with you, to succeed.  In this information age, your customers will find out what you’re trying to hide sooner or later and you’ll be well ahead of the game if you are the one supplying that information and engaging your community in an appropriate solution from the start.


Scot finds he has enough to do other than keeping track of and worse, remembering what information he told to whom, so approached the tenet of open and honest communications simply as an incredible boost to efficiency. The beneficial side-effects were a nice added bonus.

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Competition vs. Cooperation – another angle on why astronomy needs sound management practices

Competition vs. cooperation: We hear this debate a lot at Gemini.  We have our scientists and  vendors asking for more cooperation while our funders and over-seers are asking for more competition.  It can even sometimes be a bit ironic when we want to buy something (or at least consider buying something) from another nationally funded institution that is legally prohibited from selling products in an open competition while Gemini’s governing rules prohibit us from buying things without an open competition.  Other than the occasional procurement issue, though, what is the fuss really about?

Gemini believes that competition is the best way to drive down costs and increase scientific creativity. At a very fundamental level, Gemini is an international institute whose basic operating principles have open competitions at their core.  Competition forces bidders to carefully consider what they  want versus how much it ultimately costs.  Competition forces bidders to focus on the key elements of their proposal in order to constrain costs and schedule.  It forces them to drill down to the essence of their project- distilling their plan to meet their core goals without adding un-necessary features that don’t contribute to the primary mission.  Some would argue that this approach disallows serendipitous discovery, but I would contend the best serendipitous discoveries come from instruments designed to do specific tasks extremely well, not from multi-purpose instruments that lacked a true focus.  A focused project is one that usually survives the inevitable unexpected hurdles that get thrown in its way, while maintaining its core elements.

Gemini does not issue research grants; it issues contracts for finished products.  While there may be some technological development in the process, we are usually in it for the finished product.  Without a constraint on cost imposed by trying to win a competitive selection, instrument teams would be tempted to propose riskier and more complicated projects that could more easily end up spiralling out of control.  Remember, we’re not talking a few hundred thousand dollar instruments any more, or even a few million. We’re talking tens of millions of dollars. At these cost levels, focus on maintaining the core elements while working to contain  cost and schedule are critical for a project’s success.

The same philosophy as for instrumentation is also employed for science at Gemini.    New instrument proposals are competed not only based on the instrument design, costs, and capabilities, but on the associated scientific plan of how the instrument would be used.  Astronomer instrumentalists can often accept the competitive approach for these large instruments, but the science teams have more trouble.  Can’t we all just get along and work together? We’d have a better team if you didn’t force us into separate camps that don’t talk to each other and share our results. I have some sympathy for these concerns, but even so, as in the hardware case, competition forces a scientific focus that often reveals more clever ways to get the same science done with fewer resources than was thought before.  Once the scientific case (be it part of an instrument procurement, or an independent long-term instrument campaign) is chosen, Gemini believes in allowing the selected team to open up and bring in broadening participation from the community, even including scientists in the teams that weren’t selected. Competition with cooperation.

Scientists often complain that this competitive, selective approach is not how they are used to working and that Gemini should be a uniter, not a divider. Yet, these same scientists compete openly for telescope time and research grants. Aren’t these activities equally competitive and divisive at their core?  Why do we have telescope allocation committees and not just distribute the number of available nights evenly to our entire community of observational astronomers?  The answer is, of course, obvious: we hold competitions for telescope time because telescope time is a limited resource and we want to make the most of it by allocating it to only the projects most likely to return the greatest scientific yield.  Holding a science competition for an instrument or a long term campaign, then, is really no different.

So what’s the real issue here?  Is the sentiment really that competition is unfair and against the scientific norm?  Clearly not.  Is it that Gemini’s approach divides the community rather than unifies it? Well, there could be something here, but how different is it than an NSF or NASA grant or instrument proposal?  One thing Gemini has to ensure, though, is that the opportunities to compete are open to all in our community and that after the competition has been settled, there is a mechanism, and maybe even an encouragement or requirement, to open up and allow more participation by those presumably locked out after the competition. 

No, the real problem here, I think, is an issue that astronomy simply has not yet comes to terms with: how do we manage our large projects?  Do we adopt the formal ways of commercial project management, or do we rely on the heroics of the talented few individuals who have the scientific acumen combined with the technological know-how and the tireless work ethic to individually (or with a small core team) see a project through to success?  Astronomy was founded on the tireless and incredible efforts of this latter class of amazing people, yet as projects get bigger and more numerous, I think it becomes harder and harder, eventually impossible, to find individuals who can handle these projects the way they did smaller ones.  No, it’s clear, 8-figure (in $US) projects are too big to be run by these amazing individuals.  With multiple institutes spread across the world, often bound together by complex federal-level agreements each with different circumstances and bureaucracies, astronomy must adopt some set of formal management processes and structures.  There is no choice.

I believe we must, however, still maintain some sense of that earlier spirit of super-astronomer can-do-it-all.  We aren’t building a widget we can mass-produce and sell to zillions of consumers all over the world. We are building unique, focused instruments and facilities to answer new and relevant questions about our Universe and our place within it.  If a project comes in on time and on budget, yet the science has passed it by, the project is a failure.   We therefore  need professional managers who also thoroughly understand modern astronomy, but since very few business school graduates took anything beyond Astronomy 101 in college, we also need professional astronomers who thoroughly understand modern management practices.  Hence my quest for astronomers to take management seriously, to develop a career path which recognizes and values management when operating hand in hand with scientific purpose, and to train our managers to really learn and practice solid management techniques.  We can’t just take our bright astronomers who are a little less socially awkward than the rest of us, make them managers, and expect our projects to succeed. No, we have to crossover and combine our astronomical sense of purpose with a dedication to realizing them through purposeful management of people and projects who often have no desire to be managed.



Scot was one who thought he never needed to be managed and that astronomy didn’t need “bureaucratic” management. That is, until he looked around at his fellow graduate students in his group and realized all their dissertation projects were important pieces of a larger puzzle. They clearly followed from the work of students past and together, visibly broke new ground in understanding their field. This coordination of topics didn’t happen by chance; it was carefully orchestrated by his professors who would have sworn they, too, had no room for managers. Scot was being managed, whether he knew it then, or not.

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The Role and Need for an International Observatory

One immediate natural outcome of the UK’s withdrawal from Gemini is that until/unless another partner is found, the existing partners will likely divide up the UK’s share and the USA, now a 50% partner in Gemini, will become a clear majority stakeholder with over 60% of Gemini time. At that point, Gemini essentially becomes a US institution with some international partners for added flavor. This situation would certainly give the US community something it wants and needs: more 8m-class telescope time and more control of Gemini’s instruments and plans, but I think it ultimately misses out on the incredible opportunity that is Gemini.

There are numerous advantages to keeping Gemini a truly international endeavor:

1) value for the money increases as we leverage off a greater partnership

2) we increase the pool of available knowledge, skills, and innovation contributing to the observatory

3) we set a path for even larger more expensive collaborations to follow and learn from

These are all pretty obvious advantages, but there’s another: we bring people from diverse communities together. Gemini unites the world through astronomy, or at least its small corner of it. This unification happens on social, political, economic, technological, and of course scientific fronts. Gemini’s partnership is based on agreements at the highest levels of government for all its partners. We continue to reach out to our fellow mountain-top neighbors as well, in efforts to increase exchange time and collaborations – particularly with our Japanese neighbors at Subaru. What a great example astronomy(and Gemini) can set for other collaborative efforts in the future. Gemini is an important trend-setter in international astronomy collaborations.

With the US as a majority shareholder, it’s not obvious to me that the other current partners will want to remain and grow with Gemini. Without any real voice in how Gemini operates, I would certainly start looking elsewhere for collaborations where I could have a stronger voice if I were one of the minority partners. The future of the partnership itself is threatened by having a single majority stakeholder.

Gemini Hilo Base Facility with partner country flags.

A telescope and its suite of instruments are ultimately only as good as the people who use them. The goal of any observatory time allocation committee is to help ensure the best science gets done on the telescope. The larger the community of scientists, the larger pool of talent from which to obtain the best science. And yes competition, even between countries within a partnership, can also help promote the best science and the best instruments.

Ultimately, though, it also comes down to money. US astronomy has not been good at getting national-level funding large enough to build the largest telescopes that compete on the international frontier. On the other hand, the US has been better than any other country in the world at getting private funding for large telescopes and that is an important strength for the US community, but ultimately, these resources go to the privileged universities or small consortia which operate them – and not to the general national community, creating a system of astronomy haves and have nots. In order to keep the US community strength of having both a large public and private set of facilities, we must keep the public funding coming and since the US obviously couldn’t get enough money to build Gemini by itself, why should people think there’ll be more money for future large projects? The non-privileged US community needs an international partnership, ironically, in order to stay competitive at the world level -and to keep astronomy from becoming the domain of the wealthy universities only.

That an international facility not only solves the financial problem, but brings along other benefits in terms of more potential for better science, better instruments, better use of shared experiences, and an example of uniting multiple countries in a joint mission, is simply the icing on the cake. Now, realizing this potential is a lot easier said than done, but that’s the challenge we face, and probably fodder for a future post.


Scot loves to travel and experience different cultures and environments, trying to get a sense of what it’s like to live in each place he visits, not just pass through as a been-there, seen-that tourist. Perhaps this is another reason he wishes to keep Gemini international – more international trips!

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Some of my take-home thoughts from recent management books I’ve read….

After finishing a management-related book recently, I decided to collect some notes from a few other recent readings so I could have them for easy reference. Aha – a blog post, I thought. Here, then, in roughly the order I read them, are brief summaries of what I found useful in some of my recent readings.

Sloan Rules by David Farber and My Years with General Motors by Alfred P. Sloan, Jr.: I read Sloan Rules first and got interested enough to read Sloan’s autobiography later, but if you’re not all that into it, you can just read one of them. I discuss some of the innovations Sloan brought to management in my Functional Management blog entry. Holding each division of the large and growing GM accountable for their own bottom line was one of the keys to his success with GM. Choosing and fulfilling a directed corporate strategy that would have fit the desired alignment discussed in Good to Great that provided multiple automobile lines at different price points was another key element. There are some things not to like about Sloan’s way of doing business, but there are some true innovations that later generations of management at GM moved away from to their peril. Sloan Rules gives a more objective approach to Alfred Sloan than he does himself, so I would probably recommend that one if you only want an introduction to what made GM so successful. In hindsight, it’s quite interesting to reflect on how many of his practices are recommended in the books I read later on, many of which are included in this list.

Getting Things Done by David Allen: I probably don’t need to say too much about this book, but it’s a classic book on how to organize your tasks when you have too much to do. It is simply a method designed to present to yourself, as cleanly as possible, what needs doing by when, so you can decide how to appropriate your time. I’ve adopted many of the suggested techniques and now empty my email inbox at least once per day – deploying the do, delegate or defer strategy often. As a linux and multi-computer geek, I’ve adopted the java application called gtd-free as my GTD app. and dropbox to keep it in sync on multiple machines. Google getting things done or GTD if you want more information. There are also lots of variations to this approach available on the internets as well.

Good to Great by Jim Collins: I really enjoyed this book. There is a companion manuscript available which discusses how to apply the lessons in the book to non-profit organizations and although I did read it, I really didn’t think it was necessary. The parallels are pretty obvious. The premise of the book is a study of companies that have made the transition from average to sustained greatness, trying to extract the common traits of these companies. The main points include:

  • Leadership that put their company ahead of their own aspirations. These leaders were typically humble, personally visible workers for the company. They were never the superstar Steve Jobs-like leaders that industry tends to flaunt.
  • Get the right people first, then decide where to go. You don’t want people on your bus because they like the direction you’re headed. You want the people who want results for the company and want to work with each other to choose the best direction (maybe changing their minds as they proceed) to go. First who, then what, says Collins. You need the right people on your bus, the wrong people off your bus, then you can decide how to get there.
  • Confront the brutal facts. To use an analogy from the book, the best companies/leaders constantly looked underneath the rocks to see what otherwise hidden dangers and industry trends awaited them. They were not afraid to confront bad news and re-assess their companies’ visions accordingly. They promoted rigorous debate. They provided an atmosphere where employees were more concerned about bringing out the lurking bad news than in how their management was going to react to it.
  • The best companies formed their mission by analyzing and merging into harmony what they were passionate about, what they could be the best in the world at, and what drove their economic engine. Only by aligning these three areas were these companies able to succeed at the great level.
  • Discipline to adhering to the mission reached as above was key to continued success. Deviations from it, new opportunities that did not fit within it, usually delivered lower results.
  • The good to great transitions were never the result of a single event or innovation, but rather the result of applying and rigidly adhering to these principles over time. Leaders carefully planned their own succession and set up their replacements to succeed. Superstar leaders often (secretly, perhaps) want their successors to fail so as to further highlight their own genius.

Some other ideas in the book that I took note of include:

  • These companies spent little time “managing change”. With the right people and environment, change largely managed itself.
  • To help determine who are the “right people” ask them why they made the particular life-important decisions they did.
  • How to know if you have a “wrong” person in a position: one way is to ask yourself if you’d be personally relieved if that person came to you and said they were leaving for a better opportunity elsewhere. Keeping the wrong people in the wrong positions does no one any good. (This theme is picked up again in the next book.) Also consider that you may have the right person, but just in the wrong seat. (I think it was Peter Drucker who said that if he promoted someone who ended up doing poorly, it was his own fault and not that of the person promoted.)
  • Leadership needs to create an environment where the truth can be heard and people can have their say without fear of reprisal. (Another theme elaborated on in the next book.)
  • The leaders of these companies spent time meeting informally with their staff- asking them what it is they need to know; what is it they should be looking at.
  • Learn from mistakes- and act accordingly, but remember it’s less about placing blame than it is about fixing the system.
  • An interesting technique used in one instance was to hand everyone in a regular meeting (or a classroom, where the technique originated) a red flag that can be used once per term. When the flag is used, the leader has to stop and give undivided attention to what the speaker has to say.
  • Plan budgets to allow projects either full or no funding, not in between.
Recent books I've read and found interesting.

Recent books I've read and found interesting.

First, Break All the Rules by Marcus Buckingham and Curt Coffman: The authors are from the Gallup Organization and using data based on extensive surveys and interviews of successful managers, they identify four primary keys for management success and, in the process, destroy some long-established management traditions. One of the first results was what employees want to be satisfied and motivated in their jobs. The list was fairly simple, but not what traditional management stresses:

  1. To know what is expected of them.
  2. To have the necessary materials and equipment to do their job.
  3. To have the opportunity to do what they do best every day.
  4. To have received praise or recognition for good work at least once per week.
  5. To have a supervisor, or someone at work, care for them, as people.
  6. To have someone at work encourage their development.

In summary, the most important key to an employee’s satisfaction and success at work is their immediate supervisor. This is a simple, but quite powerful concept.

The authors identify a common insight of good managers: People don’t change that much. Don’t waste time trying to put in what was left out.Try to draw out what was left in. These good managers worked hard to identify the right traits required to do a job best (distinctly different from identifying the traits not desired for a given position), carefully interviewed to select these traits, set clear expectations with their employees by defining the right outcomes (and not necessarily the right way to get there), motivated people by allowing them to do what they do best rather than de-motivating them by establishing improvement plans to counter their weaknesses, and providing a structure in which people can advance in a way that makes sense for them and the company, not a blind climb up the traditional management ladder. They advocate spending more of your time with your strongest people, not “wasting” times with your worst. Work to find ways to let your people do what they do best is a strong key. You will see more results from letting people develop their strengths than you likely will from forcing people to constantly address their weaknesses.

A key point here is that these strengths and weaknesses are not skills, or knowledge, but fundamental talents. I could practice all I want and might improve my singing a little bit, but I will never be as successful as if I spent that time working on something I can already do well and getting better at that. Talent is Michael Jordan, Tiger Woods. Skills are other NBA and PGA players. That’s not to say Michael and Tiger aren’t skilled; they are, but what makes them Michael and Tiger are their talents as well as their learned skills. When you stop to think about it, there’s no reason why talents have to be for sports and not for our work lives as well. I discussed some of these ideas in my earlier post on climbing the corporate ladder.

The Five Dysfunctions of a Team by Patrick Lencioni: This book is told as a fictional case study of a new CEO coming in and remaking her leadership team to avoid the five discussed dysfunctions. A lot of the descriptions of the fictional leadership team reminded me of many such teams I’ve seen in astronomy. The five dysfunctions discussed are:

  1. Absence of Trust: this point refers to personal trust, not trust that each person will do their job well, but trust in each team member as a person, as an individual intent on working out the right thing for the team, not for themselves, a trust that you can disagree without being upset or wrong without being punished.
  2. Fear of Conflict: If there is no trust, people tend to avoid offering alternative viewpoints, to really discussing the issue at hand. False harmony often arises because people feel they can’t raise a conflicting viewpoint, even though they may in fact have one.
  3. Lack of Commitment: If team members haven’t had the opportunity to air their own views, they rarely completely buy in to the team’s conclusions and lack commitment to seeing it through.
  4. Avoidance of Accountability: If there is no commitment to a particular decision or course of action, there is unlikely to be any sense of accountability for its results.
  5. Inattention to Results: With no sense of accountability for the team’s plans, individual members pay more attention to results of their group, division, or themselves, and not the team.

The fictional new CEO of the book spends several days in off-site retreats working on overcoming each of these dysfunctions in order, but the real work is in applying the discipline to keep her team on track when they return to the office. She calls her team members out when they fail to apply what they’ve learned off-site and expects and allows others to do the same. She actively encourages contrary views in her team discussions and makes sure her team’s mission is clearly stated, understood, and agreed to by all. With a foundation of trust developed during the retreats, expanded on by shared personality analysis and constant practice at objectively engaging in conflicting discussions, the rest of the dysfunctional pyramid falls into place.

As I put this post together, I realized how similar a lot of the lessons learned are from each book. That either says something about what I think is important, what I resonate with, or something about the universality of what it takes to manage well. I’m sure it’s a little bit of each, but the nice thing about this realization is that there is little magic involved – it just takes attention and dedication to these principle. It takes time to take the effort to manage properly and to avoid getting sidetracked by the easy way out that appears good enough. Management takes time and the learning of new skills and techniques, but beyond that, there are few real secrets.


Scot’s recent reading has taken him on several different trips – from the politics and cultural environment behind the American Revolution (where he developed a new admiration for the unsung John Adams), to the evolution and eventual abolishment of slavery (ditto for John Qunicy Adams), to Dark Matter and Dark Energy (isn’t it amazing they still pay us to do astronomy when we only understand such a small portion of the Universe?), to the history of large telescopes (the price tags change; the arguments and issues remain the same), to corporate management. He knows, however, that due to coming events, he will have to veer off onto another tangent and figure out how to care for and raise his own evolutionary successor.

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Towards more realistic project costing…

I’ve been involved and associated with a number of astronomical projects now that have depended on some level of external funding. One almost universal feature of these projects has been a pitched price tag that is known to be too low by those pitching it.  The justification is usually something along the lines of “they’ll never fund us for the whole amount at once, so we have to ask for less now, then more later.”  Sometimes there’s a competition involved and people feel a low bid is their best chance to get the project.  This sort of behavior has never made sense to me.  It seems wrong and ultimately ineffective for a number or reasons.

First off, the people with the funding have seen this all before. They’ve seen lots of projects, bigger and smaller than yours and usually know what’s going on. They didn’t get to positions of power and high finance by being duped by used car salesmen.  Wouldn’t a much more impressive approach be something like:

Yes, our project price is a bit more than we originally expected.  And we could stand here and tell you it will cost only X, pretending that it was true and that we met our budget goal.   But if we do that, we all know that we would inevitably be back later, after you’ve already invested heavily in this project, and we’ll explain what unexpected things have happened to our project beyond our control and how we now need Y more to actually finish the project. We could do that, and you’d likely end up spending more that way than if we just presented our risk tree, explained our contingency, reviewed our functional de-scope options, and you funded us for our real cost of X now, confident that we’ll stay on budget.

As a project manager, which approach would you feel better about?  As a funder, which pitch would you rather hear?

Secondly, I think astronomy has suffered as an institution at the national levels for unrealistic price tags.  National funding agencies don’t want to have to keep going back to the coffers for more money to finish a project they’ve already committed to.  They want to allocate the money once, then see the project complete within that allotment.  Going back with additional requests for finding is like setting yourself up for double jeopardy.  As administrations and bureaucracies change, the commitment to your project may have also changed.    Burned once, twice, three times by project overruns, they are less likely to fund the next when there are so many other things out there asking for money.  What’s happened to the particle physics community experimental support in the US since the collapse of the SSC, for example?

Third, this same situation as at the national level occurs at all levels of projects and funders.  To make a hypothetical example:  Gemini is less likely to get money to build new instruments if most of what they build goes over budget. Similarly,  Gemini’s contractors are less likely to get the next contract if they were found to underbid a previous project.  (Remember, astronomy is a business.)

The Thirty Meter Telescope. Surely a project that cannot succeed without realistic pricing strict cost controls.

The Thirty Meter Telescope. Surely a project that cannot succeed without realistic pricing and strict cost controls.

Besides a thorough and honest evaluation of costs at the start, I think contingency planning is the key to making a project successful and on budget.  There are  three kinds of critical contingency for a typical project.  The most obvious of which is cost contingency.  What if something ends up costing more than expected?  What if something breaks? What if something you thought would work doesn’t?  One traditional way to deal with this kind of contingency is to apply some factor to the overall project cost and budget that amount for cost contingency.  Yes, that’s better than nothing, but there are always some parts of the project that are more risky than others.   Project aspects that rely on new, un-proven technology should carry a higher risk factor than aspects that are replicas of something that has been done before, for example.  The one contingency fits all rule of thumb is nice, but not really very realistic.

Then there is schedule contingency.  Ordered parts take longer to get delivered than expected.  Design work or assembly and integration tasks take longer than expected. Here again, time must be added to the project schedule (hopefully following  a similar rigorous analysis as for the cost contingency above) to account for these risks. And since time is money in terms of paying people’s time and efforts, this schedule contingency carries a cost burden as well.

Finally, there is functional contingency.  Functional contingency refers to certain aspects/requirements of a project that can be de-scoped or eliminated in order to stay on time or on budget. This type of contingency is perhaps the hardest one to use because in order to have a beneficial cost and schedule effect, it must be used early in the project – at a time when the inevitable down-stream consequences of a late, or over budget component of the project seem distant and fuzzy.  The natural temptation is often to use cost or schedule contingency first, but doing so potentially leaves you at the end of a project having spent your cost and schedule contingency, with all the functional contingency unable to be used because the design decisions have already been cast in stone and integrated into the project design.  Your only choice at this point is to go back and ask for more money. Just what we’re trying to avoid.

If astronomy and astronomy institutions are going to be able to continue to grow and pursue new projects and new opportunities,we must take project budget and schedule management more seriously. We can not rely on the “we’re this close to completion; you can’t stop the tap now” arguments to carry us through to the next level.


Scot fondly remembered a departed colleague while assembling these thoughts.  He was a very accomplished project manager and provided many valuable and interesting insights to pursue. Alas, he left this world too early.  As one colleague put it: Steve completed his life on budget and ahead of schedule.  Steve Varlese- you are missed.

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Gemini without the UK

Well, I guess it’s more or less official now. The UK appears to be pulling out of Gemini at the end of 2012. The more or less final announcement can be found on the the STFC web site, here (scroll down to Attachment A and look at projects to be funded: Gemini (until end 2012)). That combined with the recent Gemini Board announcements make it pretty clear – Gemini will be operating without the UK come 2013.

Besides the expertise and history Gemini loses with the UK’s departure, it is set to lose 25% of its funding as well. While a new partner may be found, Gemini will have to prepare a plan and budget to proceed with 25% less starting 2013. The question is now, what’s the best way to do that. The Gemini Board Resolution 2009.B.17 instructs the observatory to prepare an operations with a 7-10% reduction in funding phased into place during the period 2011-2013. Presumably, that effort is meant to be a head start in case no additional partner is found and the observatory is forced to accept a 25% reduction in 2013.

Starting the austerity measures now seems a reasonably prudent thing to do, but is it really? What is the best way to operate and plan in this new environment? How can Gemini best position itself to not only survive the coming lean years, but thrive and prosper again when they’re over? The conservative approach, and one that greatly reduces the risk of forced layoffs – which is not a bad thing indeed, is to cut now so we can cut less later.

One might also, however, consider ways to use our current full funding to its maximum advantage to prepare us to best take the 25% hit later, if indeed we have to. Can we prepare ourselves better to take a 25% hit in 3 years by spending all our budget now? Or is it better to prepare for a 15% cut in three years, by saving up money by taking a 10% cut now? To answer these questions, I think we have to look at my earlier question – what is the best way to set Gemini up to prosper after this is all over?

First, we have to clearly find ways to be more efficient. Gemini’s three largest expenses (in order, I believe) are salaries, electricity, and travel. We clearly can’t make cuts in the 10-25% range without reducing the salary expense.  So, we need to learn to operate with fewer people.  One way to reach this goal is to concentrate our efforts until 2013 on improving efficiency.   Gemini has a history of trying to do too many things – so many that there was a time when everyone knew their projects wouldn’t all get done so they  just did  either what they wanted to most, or whatever they got bugged about most.  We now have a very comprehensive observatory project planning process that helps us produce a yearly work plan that has projects that are well-discussed and resourced so that the projects we approve are matched by the resources we have.  Our resource-balancing is not yet perfect, but the part of the process I want to review here is the selection of projects.

Each division determines what it considers its “Operations and Maintenance (O&M)” projects and these projects are then resourced and inserted first into the observatory-wide plan.   With the remaining available resources, new projects can be proposed by either the division with the resources, or often by other divisions who need cross-divisional resources for their projects.  Each division prioritizes their own projects in rank order.  Through discussions and negotiations between divisions, all the observatory projects are merged together until our most used resources start to fill up.

This process works pretty well on the surface, but in a time of dwindling resources, there are (at least) two major shortcomings in it.  1) As an group of very dedicated and ambitious people, the new projects proposed tend to be an expansion of our current capabilities, not a tidying-up of something we currently do, but perhaps not as efficiently or as completely as we could.  And 2), the O&M activities do not really get reviewed outside of each division, if then.  There is no opportunity to look at what we are doing now and ask ourselves if should really continue to do them.

In a time of dwindling resources, I think Gemini needs to work hard to address both of these shortcomings, starting with our recently-approved (but before the UK announcement) 2010 plan.  We need to first look at our new projects and ask ourselves if at the end of the year, we will be more efficient than at the beginning.  It’s time to stop trying to do everything and start perfecting what we do, so we can do it later with fewer resources.  A quarter FTE we save by a project this year, is a quarter FTE we have available EVERY year hereafter for additional projects.  Spending some time now to make sure we can perform our current operations with fewer FTEs in the future will put us in good shape to survive our coming decline in available staff.

The type of project planning we wish to avoid!

The type of project planning we wish to avoid!

Second, we need to review what we are doing now, especially that which we consider O&M, our un-questioned set of annual tasks and allocated resources.  Everybody would like to do more for less, but that’s not usually possible without a concerted effort leading up to it.  There must certainly be things we do now that consume a lot of resources for little gain – at least compared to other projects that use the same amount of resources. We are going to have to cut what we are doing somehow, so best to take a close look now and work on eliminating high-effort, low-reward tasks.  In reality, there won’t be a whole lot of low-hanging fruit here, so this process will take some time and careful analysis.  But again, time spent re-evaluating what we do (and how we do it) that saves time later, will pay off ever after.  Completing these two tasks successfully will not only help us survive the coming downturn, but come out at the end (hopefully with a new partner or two in tow) ready to turn it back on and do some really exciting things.

So, linking this discussion back to reducing salaries, I’m still in a bit of a quandary. In one version of a perfect world, we would be fully-staffed now, no one would leave, and as we work our system and find ways to operate with fewer FTEs, we get rid of people, hence salary, and work our way down to our coming decreased operating budget.  In another perfect world, we would look at the resources we need in order to make ourselves more efficient and hire them now, perhaps releasing them, and the FTEs they reduced, at the end.  Reality, though, doesn’t work either of these ways: we have currently-open positions, people will leave on their own accord, and it’s inefficient (let alone a bit disconcerting) to hire people knowing they’re going to have be let go in two years or less.  I imagine, though, once we go through our O&M tasks and have some ideas of the gains (or reductions, really) to be made there, and have exchanged our new-capability 2010 projects for efficiency-improvement projects, we’ll have a pretty good idea of where the FTE-load improvements will be made, and can thus plan our hiring and redundancies accordingly. If we know the effort required in one area of the Observatory will be less at the end of our efficiency improvements, we know some positions we may not need to fill when a vacancy naturally occurs, for example.  We can also use this information to know what positions we want to make sure are filled and what positions we need to start cutting.  And we might find we need to increase one type of resource now, in order to complete our efficiency improvements for later.  It all starts, though, with re-evaluating our 2010 tasks and concentrating on efficiency improvements and exploring where we can get by with doing a little less with the least amount of impact.



Scot reiterates here that these are just his opinions and do not imply anything about what others at Gemini think or do. He is, of course, doing his best to ensure that everyone else at Gemini is converted to his point of view!

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Climbing the Corporate Ladder

I read a Harvard Business Review article a while back with a plot that made an impression on me. It was a plot of career success versus time. There were three curves plotted and all three started out with a nice linear increase in success with time that eventually began to flatten. After the flattening, one curve resumed its upward slope, one remained flat, and the other reversed its course and began decreasing with time.

The point of the accompanying article was that as people climb the proverbial corporate ladder, they inevitably get to a point where what they used to do no longer works for them. The ones that succeed after this point are the ones that can expand themselves and learn new techniques, approaches, and skills that they didn’t have before. The ones that get frustrated and refuse to change, believing that what has served them so well in the past must inevitably be good for them in the future, top out their ladder climb at this flat spot and often ultimately end up sliding back down.

When you’re stuck in a bind, you don’t get out of it by doing more of what you always do. Doing what you always do is what got you into that bind. You have to do something new.

The HBR take on the ladder climb was that if you refuse to change, you will fail. If, however, you open yourself up to change, and learn new ways, you can and will succeed through the next phase of the climb.

I’m reminded of this article because I’ve just finished reading, “First, Break all the Rules” by Marcus Buckingham and Curt Coffman (a book I really enjoyed and recommend reading). In their book, Buckingham and Coffman make a separation between talents, which are our more-or-less hard-wired ways of thinking and being, and skills which are sets of knowledge and techniques which can be learned. They argue that new talents can not be learned. The best you can hope for is to become aware of the talents you don’t have and maybe work on them enough to make the behavior consciously possible, but never a natural part of who you are.

They used this concept to explain the “Peter Principle”, where traditional corporate culture promotes people up the corporate ladder to their point of incompetence, where they either remain, or begin their slide back down – in other words, the HBR plot. The reason for people’s eventual inability to succeed when blindly climbing the corporate ladder is that the skills, knowledge, and most importantly, talents that are needed on the next rung up the ladder may not be the same as those that are needed at the rung below. The talents necessary to build a good widget are not the same as those needed to manage or train others to build good widgets. A person may have both sets of talents, but that’s just chance – there is no reason to expect any given individual to have the talents needed for each rung on the ladder.

Whereas the HBR article talked about people needing to learn new skills and techniques to survive their career flat spot, Buckingham and Coffman say only people with the right built-in talents necessary for the post flat-spot phase of their career path will continue to excel. It is partially about learning new skills and techniques, but mostly about having the right talents to do the next job. It’s not about dedicating yourself and getting new training, although some of that can of course be helpful. Rather, it’s about having, then drawing upon, the new talents that your new role requires. Don’t climb to that next rung, the authors warn, unless you have the talents to succeed there.

So, what does this say about astronomy? Well, I think the issues here are pretty generic, but may be compounded in astronomy. Typically, there is only one career path into an astronomy career – a lengthy academic trek to obtain the necessary license-to-practice PhD. (A similar situation exists for other related technical fields in astronomy.) People who succeed in this path will undoubtedly share some certain talents – talents that helped them through classwork and allowed them to produce some meaningful bit of new science, resulting in their degree and first job, etc. Pretty much all astronomers, to have succeeded to this stage, will have these talents. They will have others as well, certainly, but these, they all will have in common.

In the “real” world, managers can arise from within an organization from several different paths – some trained as widget makers, some as widget designers, others in business and administration, for example. We don’t have that same kind of kind variety in astronomy; we pretty much have one entry path and therefore we have to do a better job of selecting our managers and leaders – finding, nurturing, and promoting those with not only the talents that allowed them to excel in their technical fields, but with the talents necessary for management as well. Sending an astronomer with no management experience, but innate management talents, to management training classes will give them some skills necessary to effectively use their management talents. Sending another without the proper talents to the same classes will be unlikely to produce an effective manager. Management training for some people will never result in making them excellent managers. Passable, maybe, but not excellent.

We like to think that we can teach ourselves to do anything if we try hard enough. Having achieved technical expertise in our fields, we often view ourselves and our colleagues as living proof of this theory. Yet, it isn’t at all obvious to me that the talents and inner drive we each drew upon to succeed through our academic and technical careers would have been equally sufficient at leading us each through management and corporate careers. Hard work may not always be enough.

The first step in providing better management in astronomy, I believe, is to recognize this situation: not only do many of us lack the skills and training for effective management, but we may also lack the required talents – something much harder to develop after the fact. Armed with this awareness, we can do a better job of recognizing, rewarding, and developing those with management talents the same way we do with those with specific technical talents, and provide an alternate career path in astronomy that rewards management talents as much as the traditional path rewards our technical and teaching talents.



Scot wonders which HBR curve represents his career so far, but suspects, due to the impression the original article made on him, that he is somewhere near the flat spot – setting up for the next phase.

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The Management Corollary

OK- I have several other things I’d like to discuss: some thoughts from my current reading material, First, Break all the Rules and some thoughts on the UK’s announcement that it will probably withdrawal from Gemini and what it means to the Observatory, for example, but I thought I should close out my bit on the Scientist Dilemma and the Management Corollary from my 2008 SPIE paper first. Here, then, is how I introduced the Management Corollary in that work:

Scientists are not usually trained as mangers and managers are not usually trained as scientists. There are some talented people who can play both roles, but rather than relying on the exception, it is safer to plan for the more commonplace scenario.

Like software engineers, professional managers exist for a reason. They are trained in evaluating personnel, logistics, scheduling, fund-raising, etc. — all things not usually found on the transcript of your average scientist. On the other hand, they are not always well-versed on the science of their missions and less able to make well-informed compromises between a project’s logistical and scientific needs. The Large Synoptic Survey Telescope project is addressing this problem by putting both a trained scientist and an experienced manager in each management box of their organizational chart. This approach seems sound and time will tell how well this works, but the important point is to recognize that science leadership and management leadership are two different things and it is rare to find someone sufficiently effective in both.

One of the first images of an extra-solar planetary system from Gemini Observatory.  A result like this requires great efforts by individual scientists and project management to make happen.

One of the first images of an extra-solar planetary system from Gemini Observatory. A result like this requires great efforts by individual scientists and project management to make happen.

Now I am going to venture off into even more generalizations – a habit which often gets me in trouble – but I think the generality addresses a point that we need to address. Compounding the problems described above even further is that scientists and engineers are often actually resistant to even the idea of management. For one, our lengthened education and noble “search for the truth” sometimes makes us feel that our efforts are above the need for management. Second, most of us went into science and related technical fields to actually do things; not manage things. If we wanted to manage things, we’d be wearing our pressed-shirts and jackets, working 9-5 and making more money (I know that’s not fair to the “real-world” managers out there, but hopefully you see my point). Our rewards and training have both been for doing things, not managing others to do things. Those who don’t do are often looked on as necessary, at best (and usually not even that), and certainly with a little disdain as well. Let’s face it, as a group, we don’t respect management. We feel our motives and aspirations do not require management and we want do to things – in line with our own vision of how to reach the truth – not manage things, or worse, be managed to do things.

So where does that put us? We are not trained as managers, we don’t like to manage, we don’t like to be managed, and we don’t really even respect the field of management, yet we work on projects costing untold amounts up to hundreds of millions of dollars and involving communities of thousands of users across multiple countries and cultures. I’d say there’s a lot to be done to improve the role, visibility and contributions of effective management to astronomical projects at all points in a person’s career – from school education through project initiation, completion, and operation. Granted, there are many good managers in astronomy and most large projects appreciate and exert good management, but management in astronomy still has a deeply seated reputation problem and we have still have many managers who continue to try to do rather than facilitate others to do. So here again is part of the reason for this blog – to talk about the role of management in astronomy and to discuss how to best find and employ the experiences and talents necessary to complete large astronomical projects as efficiently, accurately, and completely as possible.


Like most managers in astronomy, Scot didn’t start out thinking he’d end up managing astronomical projects (pun intended), but has found it a nonetheless interesting career path. He still tries to do, from time to time, and is currently working on a new catalog of White Dwarf stars which will about multiply the number of known white dwarf stars by a factor of two from the last catalog and a factor of 7 from 5 years ago. Although this desire to still occasionally do may make him part of the problem described above, he thinks some commitment to doing is healthy and can directly contribute to a astromanger’s management success, an idea for another post, most likely.

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